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Introduction 
As South Africa approaches the third year anniversary of the Jacob Zuma-
led government, it is an opportune time to map some of its policy trajectories. In 
this policy essay, I shall unpack the foreign policy and strategic objectives of the 
administration, with assessment of its dominant diplomatic priorities. Former 
President, Thabo Mbeki, had a clearly articulated and highly ambitious foreign 
policy narrative from which the incoming Jacob Zuma claimed his would diverge. 
However, when the new president finally did manage to cobble together a foreign 
policy, it actually borrowed heavily from Mbeki’s own. More significantly, the 
policies as written on paper have yet to bear any resemblance to the ones being 
implemented. This, coupled with ructions and accusations of weaknesses of 
leadership in the current administration, implies an element of confusion, the roots 
of which can be traced back to the transfer of power between the two leaders. In this 
sense, South Africa’s foreign policy during the past three years or so could be said to 
have been Polokwani-sed, a reference to the tensions between former President 
Thabo Mbeki and his successor Jacob Zuma, and the implications of this fraternal 
squabble on policy in general, foreign policy in particular.  
 
The foreign policy agenda of the Zuma government 
Huge expectations greeted the current South African government at the 
ANC’s 52nd National Conference in Polokwane in 2007, at least from supporters of 
the faction that wrested control of the party from Thabo Mbeki and handed it to 
Jacob Zuma. Many of the expectations have revolved around the idea that the 
democratic coup would constitute not just a shift in personalities but in actual 
policies (Landsberg, 2011, p. 246)).  
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Mbeki had pursued a four-pronged approach of strategic goals in which he 
sought to combine foreign and domestic policies (Landsberg, 2006: p.256). The so-
called ‘African Agenda’; South-South co-operation; North-South dialogue; and 
socio-economic and politico-security all incorporated the country’s post-apartheid 
move to combining domestic growth with the replacement of international isolation 
by continental and overseas links, and notions of global governance (Landsberg, 
2006, p.257). 
It was against this background that the August 2009 Medium-term Strategic 
Framework to Guide Government’s Programme for the Electoral mandate Period 
2009-2014 was announced, signalling that the Zuma administration would champion 
its foreign policy under the broad rubric of “Pursuing African Advancement and 
Enhanced Co-operation”. The government erected a number of pillars, remarkably 
similar to those of Mbeki, namely  
(1) closing the gap between domestic and foreign policy, or the national 
interests; 
(2) Promoting Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
integration; 
(3) prioritization of the African continent through “African advancement”; 
(4) strengthening of South-South relations; 
(5) improving strategic relations with the North;  
(6) strengthening political and economic relations; and 
(7) participating in the global system of governance. 
The cement intended to hold together the edifice which these pillars were 
supposed to hold up was commonly voiced as ‘national interest,’ but it soon became 
apparent that the foundations themselves might not be able to carry the weight. Of 
major concern to critical observers soon became whether these foreign policy goals 
represented a marked shift in, or merely a reinforcement of, those pursued by Mbeki, 
and why there had been so many variations and divergences in their 
implementation. If Zuma wished to diverge from Mbeki’s agenda, why did he adopt 
it in the first place? Alternatively, was he perhaps caught between the enthusiastic 
reformers who put him into power and the actual powers responsible for putting 
policy into practice? 
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From Foreign Affairs to International Relations and Co-operation 
In one of the first moves announced by Minister Nkoana-Mashabane, in line 
with the resolution adopted by the ANC at Polokwane, was that the name of the 
department responsible for the management and co-ordination of the Republic’s 
diplomacy and foreign policy would change from the Department of Foreign Affairs 
(DFA) to the Department of International Relations and Co-operation (DIRCO). 
The idea behind this was to signal the Zuma government’s intention to introduce a 
new style and approach to the conduct of foreign affairs. The emphasis was now 
upon collaboration, and a non-hegemonic attitude that eschewed so-called ‘soft-
balancing’, wherein the bullying tactics of successive apartheid governments had 
supposedly been replaced by deals with foreign powers aimed at mutual recognition 
of each other’s self-interest.  
In her first public address as new Minister, Nkoana-Mashabane spelt out the 
rationale behind the change of name, stating it had been intended to “reflect the new 
focus that our government wishes to place on partnerships and co-operation for 
development”. In an address to DIRCO Heads of Missions Conference in August 
2009, she expanded on this motivation when she asserted that it “was largely 
motivated by international trends which require states to put emphasis on co-
operation over competition, and collaboration over confrontation”.  The minister 
went further to reason that “the globalised nature of the world necessitates that 
states continue to forge ways of co-operating better with each other” (Nkoana-
Mashabane, 2009a). 
A further motivation behind the change in the name of the department was 
to help close the gap between domestic and foreign affairs and to help demystify the 
latter by bringing them closer to the public.  In the words of the Minister, “one of 
the important areas of our work will be to make South Africans aware of the work 
that the Department is doing.  In this regard we plan to enhance our public 
diplomacy initiatives and increase the level of our engagement with South Africans 
on foreign policy matters,” and to gain the support of the people, she asserted, “our 
work needs to be known and understood by South Africans from all walks of life”. 
This would require “more clarity and focus on the role of the Department in meeting 
our domestic priorities through international partnerships and co-operation” 
(Nkoana-Mashabane, 2009b). The Minister was implicitly recognising that there was 
a need for the government to become better in devising strategies that would kelp to 
close the domestic-foreign policy divide. At the very least, there was an expectation 
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that government would communicate more effectively the rationales underscoring 
foreign policy to domestic audiences.    
During her Outreach Programme at the University of Limpopo in October 
2009, the Minister articulated a view of the national interest that challenged the 
realist notion of power and domination, preferring a notion that would involve co-
operation and partnership, and acknowledge its complexity. This all-purpose 
adhesive, ‘national interest,’ comprised the country’s “goals and ambitions; they are 
about the state’s survival, extending to its pursuit of wealth, economic growth and 
power”. DIRCO attached great currency to soft balancing, with foreign and 
domestic policies closely connected:  
We do not believe that the international system is characterised by anarchy and 
that states have to hide behind the cover of their sovereignty and focus narrowly 
on the pursuit of their national interest.  In South Africa’s scheme of the national 
interests, states can work together around a common global agenda and shared 
values for a better world. (Nkoana-Mashabane, 2009c) 
However, if this rhetoric was intended to signal a fundamental shift in policy 
by the new administration, it would have to go further than a name change. 
Examined closely, both the Mandela and Mbeki presidencies had long denounced 
hegemonic approaches to international affairs in favour of public avowals of 
cooperation and partnership-building. On the African continent  in particular, the 
‘new South Africa’ had consistently adopted a posture of partnership, not least in a 
bid to reassure its neighbours about its good intentions, and announcing that it 
sought to be a peaceful and reliable partner, no longer bent on pursuing its own 
interest at their expense. 
 
Establishing a South African Development Agency 
So, apart from the name change, what else was new? Another idea 
communicated by the new Zuma-led government was the establishment of a South 
African Development Partnership Agency (SADPA), with the aim of promoting 
developmental partnerships.  According to Minister Nkoana-Mashabane (2009c), the 
new government intended to bring together the work of several departments into 
one more practical unit. The view emanating from Pretoria-Tshwane was one of 
‘cooperation’, ‘coordination’ and ‘coherence’. In August 2009, the Minister 
confirmed that SADPA was operational, and would “contribute to capacity and 
institutional building, as well as support socio-economic and human resource 
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development” (Nkoana-Mashabane, 2009c).  However, while the idea of SADPA was 
touted as bringing order to previous chaos, it was not a new one. The first concrete 
example of translating such a vision into a programme of action had been by the 
Mbeki administration to make South Africa a virtual donor country, willing to put 
substantial resources at the disposal of the ‘African Renaissance.’ This was also 
intended to counter Western hegemony on the continent, and signal to continental 
partners that neo-colonial relationships were to be challenged. In 2000, just one year 
into Mbeki’s presidency, South Africa established the African Renaissance and 
International Co-operation Fund (ARF, 2000, Act 51, section 2), effectively making 
it an African donor country, able to influence continental politics in direct ways, and 
reversing the former Economic Co-operation Loan Fund (Act 68 of 1968), used by 
the apartheid state to lure reluctant African states into cooperating with it. In terms 
of structure, the ARF was under the control of the Director-General of Foreign 
Affairs. Funds for projects were disbursed after the approval of the Director General 
or the Minister of Foreign Affairs (DFA, 2008).  
The DFA could also tap into its own resources and claim back such resources 
after approval had been sought from the Minister of Finance. Loans or other 
financial assistance were granted in accordance with an agreement entered into with 
the country in question and the South African Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
Assistance granted was subject to terms and conditions agreed upon by the recipient 
country and the Minister, and in all cases in consultation with the Minister of 
Finance (DFA, 2008). An Advisory Committee was established to manage the Fund, 
and given the task of making recommendations to the Minister and the Minister of 
Finance on the disbursement of funds through loans and other financial assistance. 
This ARF effectively propelled South Africa in the direction of challenging 
the hegemony of the established donors. Its aim was “to promote co-operation 
between the Republic of South Africa and other countries by granting loans and/or 
granting of other financial assistance in respect of development projects in other 
countries”.  The fund set out to promote in a “proactive way” six areas and priority 
line items (DFA, 2008): 
(1) Co-operation between the Republic of South Africa and 
other countries, in particular African countries  
(2) Promotion of democracy and good governance 
(3) Prevention and resolution of conflict 
(4) Socio-economic development and integration 
(5) Humanitarian assistance 
(6) Human resource development  
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By 2007, the ARF had built up a strong track-record in multi-lateral and bi-
lateral funding in Africa.  At that juncture, government recognised the need to 
develop a policy framework for development assistance for the Republic and the 
stage was set for becoming a fully-fledged donor that would compete with and 
challenge established donors in Africa.  The DFA and Treasury had taken the lead 
by 2005 in working on a strategy for transforming the ARF into the more coherent 
Development Assistance Fund and Programme for South Africa, while a detailed 
cabinet memorandum was prepared to spell out the principles (DFA, 2008).  South 
Africa participated in the so-called ‘Paris Club process’, which focused attention on 
aid flow, critical reform of outdated and ineffective aid policies and management 
that favoured budget support as opposed to tied aid. A global assessment of progress 
was made on issues such as achieving the indicators of the Paris Declaration. So 
serious had the Mbeki government been about playing at the strategic level on 
funding that it explored the idea of doubling aid to Africa by 2010, and allocated no 
less than 0,7% of its annual income to aid by 2015. 
The 2007 strategy document on becoming a donor state suggested that it 
would consider both multilateral and bilateral funding, and conceded that the latter 
would require extensive infrastructure in order to ensure effectiveness. However, 
South Africa needed to work on beefing up this infrastructure, and it would have to 
learn from the UK’s Department of International Development (DfID), Germany’s 
GTZ, America’s United States Agency for International Development (USAID), 
Canada’s Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the Scandinavian 
donors and others.  If successful as a donor country it would then be in a position to 
influence the OECD and the Paris Club, to ensure that aid became better aligned 
with the national development agendas of developing countries, while at the same 
time campaigning for less conditional aid. It also gave South Africa a voice to push 
for greater levels of aid to be allocated to the continent and other developing 
countries and emerging economies.  
The question of how far this policy was continued by Zuma and how far it 
was replaced by a new one is closely related to growing concern over the 
government’s commitment to realizing the goal of establishing its agency amid a 
global economic recession, as well as meeting pressing socio-economic challenges at 
home. As well as a major service delivery crisis, the ANC government is under attack 
from its traditional support base, the trades unions, and is currently locking horns 
with the media as it tries to muzzle freedom of speech in a vain attempt to prevent 
disclosure of criticism of the president and the widespread corruption that has 
permeated every level of government and the civil service.  
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As Mbeki’s vision of an African Renaissance appears to be falling by the 
wayside, because of the desire by the new ruling elite to distance themselves from 
the former head of state, the government has shown little sign of making its agency 
operational. If and when it does so, it is doubtful that it will be able to continue to 
pursue the broad goals of the ARF, i.e., promotion of democracy and good 
governance; prevention and resolution of conflict; socio-economic development and 
integration; humanitarian assistance; and human resource development. More likely, 
it will have to refine and rationalize these goals to something less ambitious, perhaps 
a niche area of democratic state-building. In addition, there are institutional policy 
challenges such as where to situate the agency, whether as part of DIRCO, in the 
Treasury, or as a separate entity on its own. Whichever route government decides 
on, one thing is clear, there will need to be a high degree of cooperation between 
DIRCO and a host of other departments, especially the Presidency, Treasury, DTI, 
DPSA and others. Of more concern is whether the government is truly committed to 
realizing the ambitious goal of setting aside 0,7% of GDP to go towards aid, when its 
own a people are manifesting growing unrest at what is widely perceived, rightly or 
wrongly, as shambolic governance.  
 
Pursuing African Advancement  
A key dimension of the Zuma government’s foreign policy, as was the case 
with Mbeki, has been that of “continued prioritization of the African continent”, 
pursued under two broad thematic areas: continental and improving political and 
economic integration, and the South African Development Community (SADC). 
However, behind the rhetoric of change, there is once more a note of familiarity. 
Strategies parading under the label of “African advancement” betray a policy that 
borrows heavily from the Mbeki government’s notion of the “African Agenda”, as 
explicitly stated by Nkoana-Mashabane when she announced that “the 
consolidation of the African Agenda remains central to our foreign policy objectives” 
and that the new government “will continue to work towards achieving a vision of 
Africa which is united, peaceful and prosperous” (Nkoana-Mashabane, 2009c). 
Speculation has also been rife as to the future of NEPAD under the 
scattergun approach to foreign policy of the Zuma policymakers. It came as news 
when the government recently began to state in the open that it remained 
committed to NEPAD, having been silent on this issue for most of its first three 
years and running the risk, as a lead state in the formation of NEPAD, of distancing 
itself for domestic political rather than sound foreign policy reasons. In practice 
there remains much uncertainty about the future of this programme. In committing 
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itself, grudgingly, to NEPAD, and to improving the regional climate for growth and 
development, as well as placing the development requirements of the continent on 
the global agenda, it is signifying that it will continue to use Mbeki’s vehicles, the 
G8-Africa Action Plan, and the African Partnership Forum. However, it will not 
follow its predecessor in heralding this, or indeed any policy direction, as being in the 
national interest, and NEPAD remains the main frame of reference for intra-African 
relations and Africa’s partnership with international partners, such as the EU-Africa 
Strategic Partnership, Forum for Africa-China Partnership (FOCAC), the G8, New 
Africa-Asia Strategic Partnership (NAASP), and the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) (Nkoana-Mshabane, 2009c). Widely perceived 
as little more than ‘talking shops’, it is difficult to see how Zuma could convince his 
domestic audience of the benefits of continued membership of these groups, even if 
he himself knew.  
Such fears are also reflected in the government’s relationship with the African 
Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), the implementation of which it initially 
supported. There are now serious doubts about this governance instrument’s future, 
and almost a year after Chris Stals stepped down as South African representative on 
the Panel of Eminent persons, only in early 2012 have we been informed that ANC 
Chairperson, Baleka Mbete, will replace Stals, a good five years after he stepped 
down from the position. This does not show good leadership, added to which are 
questions around the future of the mechanism at home and the implementation of 
the action plan. The tensions between government and civil society over the 
domestic APRM process and structures are well documented, but the tensions and 
problems persist, with both sides having some answering to do about how they 
propose to restore the creditability of the instrument. 
The Mbeki government repeatedly emphasised the need to strengthen the 
African Union (AU) and its institutions, and within the context of the Grand Africa 
debate about the AU government, its stance was in favour not of Gaddafi’s United 
States of Africa (USAf), but a Union of African States. Again, there was an 
opportunity for the Zuma government to move beyond the cautious deliberations of 
his predecessor and embrace a federal vision for the continent. However, once more, 
his avowed commitment to supporting the old paradigm of building a Union of 
African states and continuing to work for the strengthening of the AU and its 
confederal institutions placed him firmly in the footsteps of the man his coup d’état 
had overthrown: “South Africa will continue to advocate for a gradual and 
incremental approach, focusing on the regional organisations, as building blocks 
towards the Union Government, South Africa’s approach continues to be premised 
on the understanding “that the African Union is a union of independent and 
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sovereign states”, and that the actions of the AU Agency “are contingent on the 
mandate of member states” (Nkoana-Mashabane, 2009c). It is hardly surprising, in 
the light of such intellectually bankrupt dogma, that the critical problems facing the 
continent and country can find any swift and long-term solutions.  
In characteristic fashion, substituting rhetoric for substantive policy, stated 
policy heralded that it would, through continental and regional issues, work towards 
the entrenchment of democracy and respect for human rights on the African 
continent (Nkoana-Mashabane, 2009c). Suffice it to point out here that the balance 
between a human rights and justice versus a peace, security and development 
approach has been a difficult one for this country to achieve during the course of the 
past fifteen years.   
There is already much expectation in the local and international media that 
the Zuma government will pursue pro-human rights foreign policy, but does it stand 
up to close scrutiny?  Presentation of these expectations, let alone their 
implementation, will have to be carefully managed, lest the foreign policy become 
just another piece of shallow international human rights discourse. 
In line with his neo-functionalist approach, Mbeki’s foreign policy strategies 
comprised strengthening the African Union (AU) and its institutions as an essential 
part to bolstering Africa’s unity and development. Zuma’s Government promised to 
continue to contribute to the organs of the AU, namely financial institutions such as 
the African Central Bank, the African Monetary Fund and the African Investment 
Bank, as well as the African Court of Justice and the African Court of Human and 
People’s Rights. As hosts of the Pan-African Parliament, South Africa deemed itself 
to have “a special responsibility to ensure that this organ of the AU enjoys 
legitimacy and effectively discharges its mandate” (Nkoana-Mashabane, 2009c). 
Policies stressed the need to ensure the necessary resources and political support to 
realize these goals, but as with promises of sustained and equitable economic growth 
on the African continent, this again shows, as the Minister of International 
Relations has betrayed on numerous occasions, that the developmental approach to 
foreign policy is in fact similar to the stance adopted by the Mbeki administration. 
 
The Zuma government’s approach to conflict resolution in Africa 
The new Zuma administration steered clear of using the evocative and 
controversial idea of “quiet diplomacy” as a means to promote conflict resolution in 
Africa. Distancing itself from this controversial concept was an attempt to show a 
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break between itself and the Mbeki administration, yet apart from ditching the term 
“quiet”, in practice the conflict resolution posture adopted by Zuma was similar to 
that adopted by the Mbeki administration. In his first year, Zuma was already 
showing a preference for non-confrontational, and accommodative, mediated 
solutions to conflict and deadly wars in Africa. 
The Mbeki government had been an activist in the area of peace diplomacy, 
and post-conflict reconstruction and development. The new government has vowed 
to contribute to the promotion of peace, security and stability, by among others, 
sustaining involvement in peacekeeping operations in Africa. It went on to say that 
South Africa would assist in the reconstruction and development of the African 
continent, especially in post-conflict countries such as the DRC, Sudan, Burundi, 
Western Sahara and Zimbabwe. But how and where would the focus lie?  
Here there may be evidence of a break with policy between the two 
presidents. Starting with the bilateral questions, in particular Zuma’s choice of first 
state visit to Angola in August 2009, he was accompanied by 11 Cabinet ministers, 
senior government officials, and the largest business delegation to accompany a head 
of state on a state visit since 1994. Zuma was determined to restore solidarity with 
Angola, a country with whom relations had been severely strained during the Mbeki 
years. Angola did not like South Africa’s hegemonic status in the region, and 
Angolan President Dos Santos never responded positively to Mbeki’s overtures for 
closer relations. For the almost decade of his rule, Mbeki failed in his bid to secure a 
state visit to South Africa by his Angolan counterpart.  In 2007, the so-called 
Browse Mole Intelligence Report was leaked by the Republic’s organized crime-
fighting agency, the ‘Scorpions,’ containing serious claims against the Angolan 
President and accusing him of having backed a plot to unseat Mbeki by providing 
financial and political backing for the campaign by the ANC Deputy-President 
Jacob Zuma to replace him as head of state (Mail&Guardian Online, 2009). The 
intelligence report suggested that Angola was unhappy with the pre-eminent role 
Mbeki had come to play in African diplomacy, and that the Angolans favoured a 
strategy in which his role would be curtailed. 
Against the backdrop of these charges, and a generally frosty relationship 
between Luanda and Pretoria-Tshwane, it was not surprising that Zuma chose 
Angola as his first destination for a state visit after becoming head of state. On a 
positive note, the idea of elevating South African-Angola ties to a more strategic 
plan sounded like a welcome move, and there were certainly bilateral benefits to be 
had economically. On a more curious level, the question arose as to whether the 
restoration of ties signalled a geo-continental shift in policy away from the likes of 
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Nigeria, Algeria, Ethiopia, Tanzania and Ghana. If not, it is unclear how South 
Africa and Angola hoped to achieve the stated goal which arose during the Summit 
of the two also playing a strategic sub-regional and continental role. Angola would 
be a curious choice to play this role, and while Luanda itself harbours a desire to be 
recognized as a regional hegemon, and seeks the status and prestige of the label, it is 
less clear whether the country has a sub-regional and continental plan, let alone the 
will to execute it.  
Zuma’s choice of anointing Angola as the Republic’s number one strategic 
partner in Africa had serious implications for the hitherto strongest bi-lateral 
African relationship in post-apartheid history. 2009-2012 saw a sharp decline in the 
relationship between Pretoria and Abuja relations, with the latter feeling abandoned 
by South Africa and the tensions in the relationship coming to a head during the 
2011 NATO war against Libya war. The Libya vote went against seeming key 
propositions about South Africa’s foreign policy, including peaceful settlements of 
disputes; African solutions for African problems; defending the sovereignty of 
African states; and defending multilateralism and the centrality of the United 
Nations (Landsberg & Moore, 2011, p.72). While it was the AU who in 2010 
nominated South Africa to return to the UNSC as a non-permanent member from 
January 2011 to December 2012, scarcely two years after it finished its first stint 
from January 2007 to December 2008, the Zuma government, together with Nigeria 
and Gabon, voted for the Libya resolutions in apparent isolation of the AU 
(Landsberg & Moore, 2011, p.73). South Africa also took the vote without consulting 
its new BRICS partners (Brazil, Russia, India, China), to the obvious chagrin of 
some like China and Russia.  
Caused in part by the fall-out over Libya, “South Africa and Nigeria, apart 
from not getting on well”, argued Patrick Smith, “will be tied up with their own 
political ructions” (The Africa Report, February 2012, Editorial). This was an 
unfortunate development. It should be remembered that between 1999 and 2008, 
South Africa and Nigeria built one of the strongest strategic partnerships on the 
African continent as they set out to “facilitate the strengthening of existing co-
operation… in peace, security and stability issues” (Quoted in Landsberg, in 
Adebajo & Mustapha, 2008, p.204). The two countries’ bi-lateral and multilateral 
relationship remained of strategic importance as they both helped to construct the 
AU and crafted NEPAD. They shaped the AU away from Muammar Gaddafi’s 
United State’s of Africa (USAf) plans into the idea of a union of states and under 
Mbeki and Obasanjo’s leadership, the two African pivotal states embarked on a real 
“concert diplomacy in the interests of African renewal, by trying to take primary 
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responsibility for managing inter- and extra-African affairs” (Quoted in Landsberg, 
in Adebajo & Mustapha, 2008, p.204).  
Pretoria-Tshwane and Abuja set out to “maintain and increase, if necessary, 
the existing frequency and regularity of consultations between the two countries of 
issues of international and regional multilateral concern”. The two regarded their 
relationship as “…of strategic importance, particularly in the light of the promotion 
of the development and promotion of NEPAD… as well as the evolution of the 
mechanisms around the AU” (Landsberg, in Adebajo & Mustapha, 2008, p.204).  
Since the unsavoury developments of the Libya votes of 2011, there has been a 
cooling off in the relationship between Nigeria and South Africa, to the point that 
by the end of 2011 and beginning of 2012 there was a frostiness in the relationship. 
According to Adekeye Adebajo, South Africa’s “maladroit diplomacy over Cote 
D’Ivoire and Libya [resulted in] the alienation of its previously close strategic 
partner, Nigeria” (Adebajo, 9 February 2012).  Patrick Matlou from the Africa 
Institute of South Africa argued that, “what is supposed to be a strategic 
partnership is increasingly becoming bogged down in differences between the two 
countries, largely seen through the eyes of how their governments engage”. He 
reminds us that “there were no celebrations of the bi-national [commission] in 2010 
and 2011” and “South Africa and Nigeria are often seen and act as rivals”. There is 
little doubt that one of the continent’s most strategic and important bi-lateral 
relations has degenerated into a tense affair in recent years. Nigeria sees itself as the 
giant, “as bigger, more resourced” and a “long time leader in Africa”, and they 
believe that they were “the champion of the anti-Apartheid struggle and that South 
Africa should, in showing gratefulness for the assistance it played in its 
transformation. South Africa, the expectation goes from Abuja, should “play second 
fiddle to Nigeria”, which, according to Matlou,  South Africa “has through the force 
of example, clarity of its international relations and policies, and through the 
leadership role bestowed on her, is often urged to lead even where she is reluctant” 
(ASIA Focus, Nov/Dec 2011, p.3). Then there is the rivalry for the UN Security 
Council seat.   
There is little doubt that one of the continent’s most strategic and important 
bi-lateral relations has degenerated into a tense affair in recent years. While during 
the Mbeki and Obasanjo years there had been tensions, the two leaders made sure 
that they managed them and preserved a “concert of powers” relationship. Since 
2009, however, the relationship has deteriorated to the point that that the two states 
are hardly on speaking terms. In a recent policy brief, the Centre for Conflict 
Resolution recommended that “relations between South Africa and Nigeria – the 
two main regional hegemons in sub-Saharan Africa – should be urgently improved to 
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provide leadership to rally a united African diplomatic front at the UN and other 
international diplomatic fora" (CCR, 2012, p.5). Many felt it was imperative that 
these African pivotal states took the lead in restoring efficiency and effectiveness in 
the AU and other continental organisations.  
While there has been much promise that Zuma would adopt a tougher more 
confrontational approach towards Mugabe and Zimbabwe, there is less likely to be a 
change of approach toward Zimbabwe, which apart from an explicit commitment to 
work towards a free and fair election at the earliest possible date, seems to evoke 
business as usual (or lack of it) in Tshwane-Pretoria. Zuma has said he would work 
with all parties in the Zimbabwe unity government, Zanu-Pf, MDC-Tsvangarai, and 
MDC-Mutambara, to address “potential fault lines” within the inclusive government 
to resolve their differences and ensure that this government works more effectively 
(Director-General Ayanda Ntsuluba, 2009). This includes resolving differences over 
issues such as the Governor of the Central Bank and the Attorney General (Director-
General Ayanda Ntsaluba, 2009). However, the government of national unity 
(GNU) is a fragile one and the three parties involved in the pact are reluctant 
participants. The GNU is likely to go through many fits and starts, and there is even 
a chance that there will be an occasional walkout staged by some of the parties, 
especially the two MDC factions. South Africa said that it would work with Western 
powers such as the EU and other cooperating partners to re-engage Zimbabwe, but 
as Mugabe continues his decline into senility  and increasingly bizarre outbursts, the 
pertinent question is who is the more detached from reality, him or Zuma?  
As far as the DRC is concerned, the Zuma government continues to use the 
vehicle created by the Mbeki government to engage the central African country in 
managing its post-colonial civil conflicts, namely the South African-DRC Bi-
National Commission (BNC) (Director-General Ayanda Ntsaluba, 2009). In 
engaging the DRC, South Africa would focus on examining progress on the 
implementation of projects and key issues related to post-conflict reconstruction and 
development, in particular helping the DRC building its capacity within the police 
and security forces, and building state institutions to govern more effectively. While 
Mbeki’s government had helped to broker a rapprochement between Rwanda and 
Burundi, Zuma’s chose to take up this role and emphasise the need for the two 
countries to improve the tenuous security situation between them. 
Sudan is another country and challenge over which South Africa has invested 
much political capital in trying to resolve political and security issues. While Mbeki 
took a personal interest in Sudan and regularly engaged in personal diplomacy, 
Zuma appears to favour a more backseat approach and delegated consultations 
around the issue to his Minister of International relations and Co-operation. The 
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Zuma government adopted a view that unity between North and South remained 
fragile, and the planned referendum over self-determination for the newly formed 
South Sudan could unearth more tensions and divisions between North and South, 
rather than cementing unity and solidarity. The Minister for international relations 
confirmed that South Africa had “an important contribution to finding a lasting 
peace in the Sudan as we chair the Ministerial Committee on post-conflict 
reconstruction in that country” (Nkoana-Mashabane, 2009a). She confirmed that 
South African troops were an important component of the AU-UN peace-keeping 
presence in Darfur” and that “former President Thabo Mbeki is leading a High-level 
Panel of the AU whose work should help us to address the challenges of justice and 
reconciliation in that country” (Nkoana-Mashabane, 2009a). 
One area of policy which the Zuma government made no attempt to disguise 
its having continued along the Mbeki route was a preference for negotiating inclusive 
governments on the continent. For instance, it supported the work of former 
Mozambique President Joachim Chisano as SADC appointed mediator to try and 
resolve the crisis in Madagascar, which has been dubbed by SADC and the AU as an 
example of “unconstitutional change of government” (Nkoana-Mashabane, 2009a). 
This is a practice that has been rejected by these continental institutions. 
Determined to reverse the unconstitutional practice and restore rule in Madagascar, 
Pretoria-Tshwane came out in support of Chissano’s push for an inclusive 
government that would see Ravalomanana as president, with the figure who ousted 
him, Rajoelina, as participating in such a government (Nkoana-Mashabane, 2009a). 
Both would be allowed to stand in a new presidential race after the transitional 
period. 
In reality there were signs of association and dissociation with the Mbeki 
foreign policy. Whether on paper, or in theory, the Zuma government’s stance 
towards conflict resolution in Africa was therefore very much in line with the Mbeki 
administration’s preference for inclusive and negotiated solutions, and showed a 
remarkable degree of continuity with the previous government’s approach.  Again, 
any talk of change and a break with the Mbeki government’s approach to conflict 
resolution does not stand up to scrutiny, as in reality the new administration has 
opted to build on the approach of its predecessor government. Furthermore, there 
are even signs that the rhetorical pretence of looking for change is in some instances 
being dropped altogether, as continuity apparently comes to be accepted as the 
norm. For Zuma, he played expedient politics by allowing some to believe he would 
change the Mbeki agenda, while knowing full-well there he would mainly stick to 
such an agenda as he helped to shape much of it during 1999-2005.  
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Improving political and economic integration of SADC 
It is now pertinent to consider South Africa’s planned strategies for 
improving political and economic integration of SADC, the new government’s 
prioritization of which should be viewed within the context of its regarding regional 
economic communities (RECs) as the pillar institutions of continental union.  As the 
Minister of International Co-operation put it, policy is “informed by our 
commitment to contribute towards the transformation and realignment of SADC 
from a regional organization preoccupied in the main by a political agenda to a 
Regional Economic Community (REC) that will meet the challenges of 
globalization” (Nkoana-Mashabane, 2009a). 
Just as regional integration and the role of SADC in nitration, peace and 
security, and governance featured prominently as a priority, so the new Zuma-led 
government  promised to focus on making a contribution towards political cohesion 
and strengthening governance and capacity in SADC, including deploying personnel 
to strategic positions within the Secretariat.  It is worth pointing out here that this 
focus on regional cohesion by the Zuma administration is not new; it has been a 
vexing question in foreign policy since the end of apartheid, namely the gap between 
intentions and capacity. The lofty promise by government notwithstanding, South 
Africa remains one of the most under-represented countries in African and 
international multilateral forums, with serious implications for its core national 
interest and foreign policy goals. On one hand, it promises to promote regional 
integration, including through SADC protocols, aimed at improving security and 
stability, infrastructure, transport (surface, air, and maritime, public administration 
and other sectors; the co-ordination of multi-sectoral plans, and harmonizing 
industrial policies. On the other hand, while it is known that there is a proposed 
International secondment policy on the table, the status of that policy remains 
unclear. 
The Zuma government has also stated that it will move towards enhanced 
regional economic integration and address sources of disagreement among members 
of Southern African Customs Union (SACU) on issues such as trade policy and 
revenue. The question begged, however, is whether the new administration plans to 
continue with the Mbeki government’s innovative policy paradigm, introduced 
towards the latter years of the previous administration, namely that of development 
regional integration. What it does indicate is that it will be moving towards 
enhanced regional economic integration and addressing sources of disagreement 
among members of SACU on issues such as trade policy and revenue sharing.  
The Jacob Zuma Government’s Foreign Policy: Association or Dissociation? v.1, n.1. Jan/Jun.2012 
 
Austral: Brazilian Journal of Strategy & International Relations – v.1 n.1, Jan/Jun.2012 90 
 
The closest there is to an explicit developmental idea is to be found in 
government’s stated policy towards EPAs, articulated in the 2009 MTSF, wherein 
the idea was mooted that South Africa would seek to ensure that EPAs have a 
development agenda and support regional integration. However, there continues to 
be a major difference amongst SADC states over how to respond to EPAs, with some 
being apprehensive about embracing this platform and others viewing it as an 
important trigger for development. Either way, there is a need for SADC common 
positions over EPAs and other trade instruments. It was therefore understandable 
when the Minister for International Relations responded by stating that South 
Africa must “continue to reflect on challenges regarding our interaction with 
countries in SADC, particularly our varying positions on negotiations around the 
EPAs with the EU” (Nkoana-Mashabane, 2009a).  There is thus a need to analyse 
the implications of the EPAs on the SADC regional integration programme. 
The Zuma government’s is also grappling with the issue of putting into 
operation the Project Preparation Development Fund (PPDF), as the first step 
towards the SADC Development Fund. This plan coincides with a global financial 
crisis, and the chances of donors honouring their commitments, or for that matter 
SADC member states, have been dealt a blow. The questions arise as to whether 
South Africa will take it upon itself to engage the donor fraternity to ensure that 
they meet obligations and turn pledges into disbursements. What about the 
relationship between the SADC Fund and the planned SADPA? What are South 
Africa’s own plans to bolster such a fund? An even more significant question in the 
context of this paper is whether the Zuma government will prove more effective in 
executing its stated regional mandate, or whether we are likely to see dithering on 
the past of government, which would result in weak implementation of stated goals?  
 
Strengthening South-South Co-operation 
The third foreign policy pillar of the Zuma administration to consider, 
according the the 2009 MTSF, is that of “strengthening South-South relations”. The 
first point to note is that there is a high degree of continuity with the Mbeki 
administration of “consolidating the agenda of the South” through South-South co-
operation. The main rationale underscoring the South-South cooperation strategies 
of the Zuma government would be to “ensure the creation of political, economic and 
social spheres necessary for the fight against poverty, underdevelopment and 
marginalization of the South”.  Again, Minister Nkoana-Mashabane as good as 
admitted to following Mbeki when she stressed that “South Africa will continue to 
Chris Landsberg  
 
 
AU
ST
RA
L: B
RA
ZIL
IAN
 JO
UR
NA
L O
F S
TR
AT
EG
Y &
 IN
TE
RN
AT
IO
NA
L R
ELA
TIO
NS
 
91 
 
build relations based on solidarity and cooperation with regional and sub-regional 
groups in the South such as the Non-aligned Movement (NAM), Forum for China-
Africa Co-operation (FOCAC), Africa-India Forum, G77 plus China, the India-
Brazil-South Africa Dialogue Forum, and the New Asia-Africa Strategic Partnership 
(NAASP) in pursuit of the consolidation of the African Agenda”.  The Medium-term 
Strategic Framework of 2009 stated that the focus of “South-South cooperation” 
strategies would be on (MTSF, 2009): 
1. continue engagement with organizations of the South, such as the 
Non-aligned Movement (NAM), the G77Plus China, and others. 
2. implement and monitor of all India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) 
Tri-lateral Forum Agreements and Actions Plans, as well as ensure that sectoral 
agreements deliver tangible results that reach and benefit the citizens of all 
three countries. 
3. revitalize the New Africa-Asia Strategic Partnership (NAASP) as a 
relevant vehicle for South-South co-operation, and strive to ensure that the 
challenges in implementing the Asian-African projects that were agreed upon at 
the Asian-African Summit in 2005 are addressed. 
4. Engage and support efforts of the African Union and the United 
Nations to find a lasting solution to conflict situations on the African continent, 
as well as conflicts elsewhere, including the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
 
On the South-South cooperation score, there is a clear ethos of continuity 
between the emerging policy positions of the Zuma government and those adopted 
by the Mbeki administration. It should be remembered that the Southern 
formations which the Zuma government chose to prioritize were the very ones in 
which the Mbeki government played pivotal roles in revitalizing and strengthening, 
including IBSA and NAASP, and NAM and the G77 Plus China formation (C. 
Landsberg, 2010, pp. 227-228). Indeed, the new administration no longer even 
pretended to deny the strong political and economic ties Mbeki had cultivated with 
India, Brazil and China, as providing opportunities to diversify its international 
relations, especially in the political realm. 
Even had they wished to fulfil their pledge to break with the past, the 
administration quickly discovered that, on the South-South front at least, the Mbeki 
government had refined and consolidated policy to the extent that there was little 
room for manoeuvrability.  It thus had no choice but to opt for continuity and focus 
on implementation and operationalisation of these policy directions and decisions. 
What is now needed is to shift the attention in these organizations and programmes 
to implementation of policy and to ensure that they realize the lofty goals they set 
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out to achieve. The challenges in this regard should not be underestimated. Jacob 
Zuma took over the levers of policy at a time when many fellow heads of 
government and states of Latin America, the Caribbean and Asia were starting to 
disengage from many of these processes. A huge burden will fall on South Africa’s 
shoulders if they try to rescue and resuscitate these initiatives, and the government 
faces enormous challenges on the home front, which may compel the President and 
his Cabinet Ministers to scale down on foreign policy adventurism and focus on 
domestic priorities. This may mean that initiatives like IBSA and NAASP have to 
be neglected.  
Again, there was continuity between the strategies of the two 
administrations, but examination of the practice and actual implementation of 
policy shows little sign that sustaining or securing the survival of these forums 
remains a key priority of the Zuma government. It is thus the policy-to-
implementation gap, prompted by the factionalism within the ruling alliance as well 
as tensions in government, which we have to look to when it comes to the Zuma 
government. Suffice to point out that Zuma inherited from his predecessor a well-
defined South-South strategy and there would be no need for them to reinvent the 
wheel; instead, the focus had to be on implementation.   
 
Strategic relations with formations of the North 
Engaging the Northern industrialized powers and their associations is the 
fourth pillar of the new Zuma administration’s foreign policy, and in this respect we 
again see signs of association as well as dissociation with those of Mbeki. The 
rationale behind a strategy to continue engaging the industrialized powers was 
advanced by the International Relations and Co-operation Minister when she stated 
that “countries of the North are undeniably an economic power based of the world 
and remain essential to the economic well-being of the developing world”. Given 
these economic considerations, South Africa set out to “forge partnerships with these 
countries within the context of trade, development and co-operation”. Engaging the 
North, policy stated, would furthermore be done to advance South Africa, the 
continent and the rest of the South’s developmental agenda”. In the medium term, 
policy toward the North would see the Zuma government continue pursuing a 
developmental and investment-oriented approach to engagements with the North, 
such as the OECD and the G8, as well as continuing to work for the consolidation of 
the African Agenda through the implementation of relevant NEPAD programmes in 
all such engagements. 
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The visit in August 2009 by US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton confirmed 
South Africa’s wish to cement close ties with Washington and strategic economic 
relations in particular, and it wished to take “full advantage of the US Africa 
Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA)”,  and in this respect it might be said that 
Zuma was more ambitious than his predecessor, Mbeki. It should be remembered 
that, during the Mbeki and George W. Bush presidential eras in South Africa and 
American respectively, the bilateral relationship between the two countries cooled 
off significantly because of differences over US unilateral conduct globally and the 
illegal American-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. On the other hand, there was 
American irritation over South Africa’s ‘quiet’ approaches to the crisis in Zimbabwe. 
The Zuma government was committed to strengthening itself to rebuild this 
relationship and to extract maximum economic benefit from the world’s remaining 
super power. The 2011 NATO-led Libya war prompted furious responses from 
Pretoria-Tshwane, and the relationship with the P-3 of the UN Security Council, 
France, Britain and the US, deteriorated rapidly.  
Reaching out to the EU, on the other hand, has been a continuous process by 
both Mbeki and Zuma,  with both presidents determined to bolster relations with 
South Africa’s leading trading partner, and turn this reality into benefits for itself 
and for the African continent. South Africa has committed itself to advancing AU-
EU relations by taking the 1st Africa-EU Action Plan implementation process. The 
Zuma administration has taken a leaf out of the book of its predecessor, which had 
learned some tough lessons from the TDCA negotiations with Europe, above all how 
not to go it alone. So, as government takes up the EU-Africa mental, it has to take 
on board other Africans and their fears. 
Comparing the overall Zuma policy vis-à-vis the North, there is an overall 
similarity in policy, notably  engaging the North, or otherwise, with the aim of 
extracting commitments for African and Southern developments priorities. Under 
the mantra of ‘national interest,’ both leaders have sought to advance the agendas of 
Africa and the broader development community. Zuma did try to struck a more 
positive cord with the Americans, but the relationship soured in the aftermath of 
America and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s ((NATO’s) abuse of United 
Nations Security Council resolutions 1970 and 1973 relating to the conflict in Libya 
in 2011, resolutions both which South Africa voted for. When NATO turned a no-fly 
zone mandate (res. 1973) into a regime change agenda, it resulted in major damage 
in the relationship. How successful Zuma will be in having close relations with 
northern powers while also introducing an element of independence vis-à-vis these 
powers difficult to ascertain. 
 
The Jacob Zuma Government’s Foreign Policy: Association or Dissociation? v.1, n.1. Jan/Jun.2012 
 
Austral: Brazilian Journal of Strategy & International Relations – v.1 n.1, Jan/Jun.2012 94 
 
Participation in the Global System of Governance 
The fifth pillar of the Zuma government’s evolving foreign policy is that of 
“participating in the global system of governance”, remarkably similar to Mbeki 
administration’s “global governance” strategies”. In the early part of this treatise, 
dealing with foreign policy strategies of the Mbeki government, I have made the 
point that the South African government from 1999 to 2008 essentially followed a 
transformational and developmental foreign policy. This was especially true in 
relation to the global governance strategies of the Mbeki government, a diplomacy 
dimension from which Zuma borrowed diplomacy as he and his government 
endorsed the notions of transformation and developmentalism in their future foreign 
policy. Again, the issue here is that, on paper, continuity revealed itself between the 
new government’s foreign policy and that of its predecessor. The discontinuities and 
dissociations happened in practice.   
The Minister of International Relations and Co-operation declared soon after 
the April 2009 polls:  
We believe that the transformation of the international system will not only give 
Africa a bigger voice, but will put us in a better position to address the 
developmental plight of our continent. We will continue to work other nations 
and progressive non-state actors for the reform of the United Nations, including 
the Bretton Woods Institutions. We cannot achieve our objectives of a better 
world when the current configurations of the Security Council of the UN is 
informed by the geo-politics and security concerns of the 1950s when most of 
Africa was under colonial rule (Nkoana-Mashabane, 2009a).   
The transformational aspirations of government as articulated here targeted 
for reform and transformation both political and global financial institutions. In 
validating the idea of a developmental foreign policy, the 2009 MTSF stated that in 
“strategic relations with the North”, the Zuma government’s “global system of 
governance” strategies were geared towards ensuring “that the developmental 
objectives of the developing world are addressed”.  This objective would be met 
through six sub-objectives (MTSF, 2009).: 
1. Active participation in the global economic reform processes 
through continued engagement with the international and regional economic 
and financial institutions, such as multi-lateral development banks, the IMF 
and the G20. 
2. Ensuring that the current momentum within the G20 is maintained 
and that it does not focus only on efforts to mitigate the global crisis, but also 
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reaching agreement on governance reforms at the Bretton Woods 
institutions.  
3. Utilizing existing negotiating grouping and alliances to pursue 
objectives of developing countries. 
4. Working with like-minded countries in forging a collective for the 
transformation of global governance. 
5. Playing an active role in the WTO in ensuring the conclusion of the 
Doha Development round of negotiations and strive towards common 
objectives with like-minded partners. 
6. Continuing active engagement within global governance 
institutions on political, economic and security matters, including the reform 
of the United Nations and sustainable development and disarmament. 
 
Here too we did not see much novelty. It will be recalled that the Mbeki 
government had pursued a two-pronged global governance strategy, one aimed at 
politico-security questions, the other at socio-economic development. While the 
Zuma government did not specially distinguish between politico-security and 
economic and development strategies, it is clear that the emerging global governance 
strategies emphasized both dimensions in practice. Indeed, Mbeki placed great 
emphasis on playing a “prominent role in global affairs” and in an “active and 
purposeful manner [pursuing] its interests at the UN” (DFA, 2005, p.20). For the 
former head of state, this amounted to unjust use of power by the West and other 
powers within the annals of the UN and other global governance institutions. 
Notwithstanding the fall-out over South Africa’s Libya vote, and its loss of face 
amongst the ranks of the West, BRICS, and Africa, the Zuma government insisted 
that UN reform remain a key priority. Thus, Minister Nkoana-Mashabane was 
dedicated to “…ensuring that the UN remains central to addressing global peace 
and security issues. While we are on the UN Security Council as non-permanent 
members”, she vowed, “we remained concerned that we are there as second class 
citizens when we should all be represented on the UN equally”. She stressed to her 
fellow IBSA members that “…the time is opportune, given our joint representation 
in the UNSC, to conclusively advance UNSC reform”. Nor did the Minister confine 
her remarks to the UN and UNSC, also offering advice to other multilateral 
institutions: “On international trade issues”, opined the Minister, “the conclusion of 
the WTO’s Doha Development Round has been taking far too long and it is time 
that we bring this to finality, but certainly not at the cost at achieving a balanced 
outcome for developing countries” (Nkoana-Mashabane, 8 March 2011). As with 
Mbeki’s, so Zuma’s government behaved like the spokesperson for the developing 
South, at least as stated in policy.  
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The similarities between what the Zuma and Mbeki governments, at least on 
paper, were palpable, yet it was in practice that we witnessed the divergences. Sharp 
differences emerged, for example over the two administrations’ voting behaviour 
within the UN. Whereas the Mbeki government adopted consistent positions vis-à-
vis such controversial issues as Iran, Zimbabwe, Myanmar and others, and 
consistently abstained or even voted no, the Zuma government, as stated earlier, has 
displayed much prevarication in its voting behaviour regarding issues like Libya 
(resolutions 1970 and 1973) and Syria during 2011 and 2012.  
Burned by its experience over the vote concerning Libya, and NATO’s 
selective interpretation of Resolutions 1970 and 1973, the South African 
representatives in New York opted to abstain on a crucial vote against Syria in 
October 2011, stating that “we were concerned that the resolution should not be 
part of a hidden agenda to yet again institute regime change” (Sowetan Live, 6 
October 2011). DIRCO spokesperson, Clayson Monyela went further and argued 
that “…we are concerned that the sponsors of this resolution rejected language that 
clearly excluded military intervention in the resolution of the Syrian crisis” 
(Sowetan Live, 6 October 2011).  
Apart from these controversial votes in the UNSC, the Zuma administration 
vowed to continue to work towards attaining the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs), the attainment of which in African countries, according to the 2009 MTSF, 
South Africa will continue to champion. Here South Africa emphasized a linkage 
strategy which suggested that “democracy goes hand-in-hand with economic justice 
and prosperity” and as such it was important to:  
ensure that Africa stays the course in its pursuit to meet the MDGs.  The tactic 
the new government set out to employ would be to “work with progressive forces 
in the world to implore the international community to play a constructive part 
in complementing our efforts.   
While participating in his first G8 Africa session of the G8 Summit in 2009 in 
Aquila, Italy, Zuma urged G8 countries to commit themselves “to supporting 
African efforts towards promoting development, good governance and achieving the 
MDGs”. The problem to date has been that stated goals to pursue these global 
governance strategies, including a promise to ensure that the MDGs do not fall by 
the wayside, or ensuring that issues of UN reform is not swept under the carpet, has 
not been met with practical leadership. South Africa has not shown the necessary 
leadership to forge coalitions with like-minded states so as to ensure that these issues 
stay on the front-burner; it has not kept the feet of the industrialised powers to the 
proverbial fire. While South Africa is Africa’s only member on the G20, and even on 
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the G20’s development committee, it has not used its influence to ensure that the 
G20 comes up with a credible development plan that would meet the special needs of 
Africa or the developing countries. Again, the problem has been lack of action 
(Landsberg, “Rising powers and the G20, September 2011).   
Much has happened since South Africa articulated these goals. The country is 
now a member of the august Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa (BRICS) 
forum, a proposed economic countervailing block in world affairs. BRICS still has to 
clarify its agenda, both political and economic, and the economic differences 
between these powers, most notably inequalities amongst them, could become a 
source of tension. Indeed, these countries will not just have to address this potential 
source of conflict between them, but they are also under pressure to ensure that their 
respective regions benefit from their presence, as opposed to them becoming new 
sources of exploitation and neo-imperialism in Africa and other developing regions. 
South Africa is already under pressure to ensure that it represents African interests 
in a robust and legitimate manner within BRICS. Indeed, the assumption that 
South Africa’s interests are in line with African interests is one that is challenged by 
many.  
We should also remember that two of the BRICS members, China and 
Russia, are members of the UN Security Council, and the other three are not.  This 
makes for greater divergence instead of converges between the BRIC members, and 
careful management of the relations is called for.     
 
Strengthening political and economic relations  
The emerging foreign policy trajectories of the young Jacob Zuma 
administration not only focused on multilateral dimensions and institutions but also 
placed an emphasis on the need to strengthen bi-lateral political and economic 
relations.  Here too it took its cue from the Mbeki government’s foreign policy 
priorities, as it placed major emphasis on economic diplomacy, and strengthening 
economic relations with as many states as possible.  In her address to the Heads of 
Missions Conference in August 2009, the minister of International Relations 
reminded heads of missions and diplomats that:  
Among our main challenges in the pursuit of our foreign policy objectives is the 
alignment and co-ordination of South Africa’s economic diplomacy across all 
spheres of government; strengthening economic diplomatic capacity in our 
Missions; and improving efforts aimed at marketing the brand South Africa and 
Africa abroad (Nkoana-Mashabane, 2009a).  
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Stated policy held that South Africa’s economic diplomacy strategy would 
continue to focus on strengthening economic relations with traditional and 
established economic partners; expanding trade relations with emerging markets in 
Asia, Latin America, and Eastern Europe; and the promotion of intra-Africa trade 
so as to enhance economic development on the continent. 
The foreign policy dimensions of the 2009 MTSF identified as vital the goal of 
“strengthening political and economic relations”, in particular to strengthen 
“economic diplomacy”, and the foci would be on nine nodal points (MTSF, 2009): 
(1) Promoting and expanding bi-lateral partnerships that are 
aimed at advancing the economic interests of South Africa through 
structured mechanisms  
(2) Continuing to focus on the consolidation of economic 
relations with traditional and establish economic partners 
(3) Expanding trade relations with emerging markets in Asia, 
the middle east, South America, Eastern Europe, and the promotion of 
intra-Africa trade to enhance economic development in Africa 
(4) Strengthening people-to-people co-operation through civil 
society organisations and other like-minded stakeholders 
(5) Ensuring that there is alignment and coordination of South 
Africa’s international engagements amongst and between all spheres of 
government and between public and private sectors  
(6) Strengthening economic diplomatic capacity in South 
African missions abroad, by amongst others undertaking effective and 
intense training for all representatives abroad 
(7) Continuing to engage China to finalise the Partnership for 
Growth and Development (PGD) 
(8) Improving efforts aimed at marketing South Africa and 
Africa abroad 
(9) Addressing the weaknesses identified in the communication 
of South Africa’s foreign policy positions, both in the foreign arena and 
domestically. 
This emphasis on economic diplomacy came as no surprise as the new 
government set out from the onset its new terms to close the domestic-foreign policy 
divide and to introduce strategies that would make it better possible for DIRCO to 
make a more effective contribution to help meet the national strategic goals 
identified by government. 
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In October 2009, DIRCO released its much anticipated document, a 
Conceptual Framework on Identification of Anchor States in the Five Geographical 
Regions Recognised by the African Union (DIRCO, October 2009). This was a policy 
statement in search of “anchor states”, i.e., those states that “…are influential in 
their own regions due to strong economies, large populations, size of territory, 
military strength, ability to project a foreign policy, peace, security and stability, 
and whose collapse would result in “trans-boundary mayhem, but whose prosperity 
and stability would bolster its region’s economic vitality”. This document subscribed 
to the idea that “…leading [African] countries must have the capacity to act as 
catalysts for development, good governance, and peace and security in their 
respective regions”. “Anchor countries”, continued the policy document, “must use 
their influence to drive the agenda of development through integration, political 
cohesion, to entrench peace, security and stability on the continent” (DIRCO, 
October 2009, p.8).     
 
CONCLUSION 
On paper, there were many similarities and a high degree of association 
between the broad macro aspects of the Zuma government’s foreign policy and those 
of Mbeki. In practice however, many deviations and dissociations emerged and the 
Zuma foreign policy showed many degrees of dispersion and a lack of focus. While 
the new government said that the ‘national interest’ would be the cement that 
would hold together its foreign policy, how such interests linked up with other macro 
frameworks, such as the African advancement, South-South co-operation, North-
South dialogue, active participation in the global system of governance, and 
strengthening political and economic relations, are less clear. There is thus need to 
dot the i’s and cross the t’s in order to build synergy between various foreign policy 
strands. The assumption that these different foreign policy strategies necessarily 
cohere is one that needs challenging. The very idea of South Africa’s national 
interest needs fleshing out and even turned into a fully-fledged doctrine that would 
guide the Republic’s foreign policy. 
There is an equally serious challenge faced by the Zuma government’s foreign 
policy, viz., a gap between a stated foreign policy on paper and the actions taken by 
government in practice. There is thus a policy-to-operations gap that has revealed 
itself as far as the Zuma government’s foreign policy is concerned. In short, while the 
Zuma government boasts a clear foreign policy as articulated on paper, in reality 
there exists a two-pronged gap that needs urgently to be addressed: a gap between 
the stated national interests and broad foreign policy stratagems; and a gap between 
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stated foreign and the actions embarked upon by government. In the final analysis, 
the foreign policy of any country is only as good as its outcome.  
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ABSTRACT 
In an attempt to bring coherence and predictability to South African foreign 
policy, the government of Jacob Zuma has, since assuming office in May 2009, put 
emphasis on forging relations with countries and regions, and key international 
relations issues and concerns. According to policy, the pursuit of the national 
interest lay at the heart of the Republic’s international strategies, with ‘national 
interest’ being used as a cement to hold together the edifice of post-Mbeki 
government’s foreign policy. On paper, the government appears to have gone far in 
articulating this ambitious foreign policy, however a number of questions arise. 
Have these policies been put into practice and if so do they follow the stated agenda 
or are there serious deviations? Has there been association with Mbeki’s policies on 
paper and dissociation from such policies in practice?  
How do the various tenets of foreign policy relate to the epicentre of the 
national interest and to one another? Do they represent a marked shift from the 
previous Mbeki government’s African Agenda’ or are they a mere copy? This paper 
seeks to answer these questions, in particular investigating whether a gap has 
developed between articulated, or stated, policy and how it was pursued in practice, 
through implementation.  
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